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Abstract 22 
 23 
The focus of this paper is the requirement that the use of live animals in experiments and in vivo 24 
assays should never be allowed if those uses involve severe suffering. This requirement was first 25 
implemented in Danish legislation, was later adopted by the European Union, and has had 26 
limited uptake in North America. Animal suffering can arise from exposure to a wide range of 27 
different external and internal events that threaten biological or social functions, while the 28 
severity of suffering may be influenced by the animals’ perceptions of their own situation and 29 
the degree of control they are able to exert. Severe suffering is more than an incremental increase 30 
in negative state(s) but involves a qualitative shift whereby the normal mechanisms to contain or 31 
keep negative states at arm’s length no longer function. The result of severe suffering will be a 32 
loss of the ability of cope. The idea of putting a cap on severe suffering may be justified from 33 
multiple ethical perspectives. In most, if not all, cases it is possible to avoid imposing severe 34 
suffering on animals during experiments without giving up the potential benefits of finding new 35 
ways to cure, prevent, or alleviate serious human diseases and generate other important 36 
knowledge. From this it follows that there is a strong ethical case to favour a regulatory ban on 37 
animal experiments involving severe suffering. 38 
 39 
Key words: animal experiments; animal suffering; ethics; humane endpoints; refinement; severe 40 
suffering 41 
 42 
Introduction 43 
 44 
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There are two main discussions about the use of animals in potentially harmful biomedical and 45 
other forms of research. The first is about whether to use animals, the other is about how to use 46 
them.  47 
 48 
The first, most fundamental discussion questions the moral acceptability of using animals for 49 
experiments for the sake of human benefit where these experiments cause harm in the form of 50 
discomfort, pain, or other suffering and are nearly always followed by killing the involved 51 
animals. This debate about whether at all to use animals in research and testing is dominated by 52 
thinkers who, based on a variety of ethical positions such as utilitarianism, animal rights, or 53 
virtue theory, favour a view to the effect that it is always wrong to use animals for such 54 
experiments.1 55 
 56 
The second discussion takes a more conventional, anthropocentric starting point which does not 57 
question the premise that it is morally acceptable to use animals for research and testing aimed at 58 
important goals such as finding new ways to cure, prevent, or alleviate serious human diseases. 59 
Rather, this debate is about which requirements must be fulfilled for such animal-based research 60 
to be morally acceptable. So far, two kinds of requirements have been discussed. One is that 61 
scientists should strive to minimize harm to animals involved in research and testing, 62 
exemplified by a focus on the so-called 3Rs, i.e., on ways to Reduce the number of animals used 63 
to the minimum necessary for scientific validity, to Replace experiments with live animals with 64 
alternative methods, and to Refine procedures of the remaining animal experiments so as to 65 
avoid or minimize animal suffering.2 The other is that animals should be used only when that use 66 
is likely to give rise to genuine benefits to humans (or animals), or to ensure that there is a proper 67 
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balance between harm imposed to animals and expected benefits. It is fair to say that the 3Rs 68 
today have been implemented as an integral part of the way animal experiments are regulated 69 
and reviewed across at least the Western World, and that the requirement for some sort of a 70 
Harm-Benefit Assessment preceding animal experimentation also has a wide uptake,3 although 71 
not universally embraced.4 72 
 73 
This paper addresses a third requirement relating to animal experimentation, which is to put an 74 
absolute cap on the suffering that animals may endure as part of an experiment. According to this 75 
requirement experiments should never be allowed if they involve severe suffering. Of course, 76 
this requirement could be seen as a special case of the requirement to Refine procedures, but 77 
whereas the requirement to refine is always relative to what is possible without sacrificing the 78 
goal of the research, this requirement is absolute. 79 
 80 
Such a requirement has been in place in Danish legislation for more than two decades and is 81 
included in the recent European Union directive which defines the minimum standards of the 82 
regulation of animal experimentation put in place in each of the 28 EU countries. Thus in the 83 
directive (Article 15(2)) it is said that “Member States shall ensure that a procedure is not 84 
performed if it involves severe pain, suffering or distress that is likely to be long-lasting and 85 
cannot be ameliorated”5; however, there is an important modification in the form of a safeguard 86 
clause to which we will return. 87 
 88 
Such a ban of animal experiments involving severe suffering seems to cut across the ethical 89 
discussions mentioned above. On the one hand, it is presented as another requirement within a 90 
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context where the moral legitimacy of using animals for experiments is not questioned and it 91 
therefore seems to belong to the second of the above presented discussions, the one focusing on 92 
which type of experiments are morally acceptable under a general assumption that at least some 93 
are. On the other hand it seems to ban certain experiments out of a concern for protecting 94 
animals without considering the potential benefits of the experiments foregone and may therefore 95 
be seen as being in line with the view that it is always wrong to use animals in harmful 96 
experiments found as one side of the first discussion. Part of the aim of this paper is to discuss 97 
whether, and to what extent, a ban of experiments involving severe suffering could be situated 98 
within the more conventional and anthropocentric debate on animal experimentation. 99 
 100 
The main claim in this paper is that there are strong moral and scientific reasons in favour of a 101 
ban on animal experiments giving rise to severe suffering. These reasons are that severe 102 
suffering involves a qualitative step-change in negative state which we summarise as from 103 
unpleasant to unbearable and that it seems possible, to a large if not full extent, to avoid severe 104 
suffering without jeopardizing research progress. Even if there were cases which posed a real 105 
dilemma between the concern to avoid severe suffering and allowing research of potential vital 106 
human benefit we argue that there can be good moral reasons to uphold a ban. 107 
 108 
Our starting point will be to trace the origin of this idea and explore the degree to which it has 109 
been implemented in legislation and guidance documents in different parts of the world. After 110 
that we will consider what is meant by suffering and outline its different forms. Following that 111 
we will discuss how severe suffering differs from other unpleasant experiences, arguing that 112 
severe suffering is not just more of the same but involves a qualitative leap from unpleasant to 113 
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unbearable. In light of that we discuss two main ways of underpinning a ban on severe suffering 114 
in terms of ethical theory which will align with either an abolitionist  or a more conventional line 115 
of thinking. We will then discuss how in practice to draw the line between non-severe and severe 116 
animal suffering. Furthermore, we discuss to what extent it is possible to implement a ban on 117 
severe animal suffering without forgoing important benefits such as finding new ways to cure, 118 
prevent, or alleviate serious human diseases. This discussion ends with a guardedly optimistic 119 
view. Finally, before concluding we discuss from the view of the main ethical positions outlined 120 
how best to deal with the possible cases where there is a real dilemma between avoiding severe 121 
animal benefits and potential vital benefits to human health. 122 
 123 
Origin of the Idea of an Upper Limit to Suffering and Its Implementation in Different 124 
Parts of the World 125 
 126 
The idea of banning suffering beyond a certain level is first found, to our knowledge, in a report 127 
issued by the Danish Animal Ethics Council – an advisory board set up according to the Danish 128 
law on animal protection. In a statement from 1992 the Council argued that an acceptable ethical 129 
stance regarding the use of animals for experimentation and testing requires that one considers 130 
the perspective of all affected parties and that “when aiming to take the perspective of the 131 
affected animals, one cannot help to view strong pain and other severe suffering as ethically 132 
problematic”6 (the senior author of the current paper, PS, was then chairman of the Council and 133 
drafted the report). The report recommended that experiments involving strong pain and other 134 
forms of severe suffering should be prohibited according to Danish law. A revision of the Danish 135 
law with this ban implemented was passed by the Danish parliament in 1993.7 According to § 7 136 
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of that law an animal may not as part of an experiment “experience strong pain, other intense 137 
suffering or intense anxiety”.  138 
 139 
Examples of applications which have been rejected in Denmark in light of the ban include 140 
toxicological studies with death as an endpoint (personal communication Axel Kornerup Hansen, 141 
University of Copenhagen) and neurobehavioural experiments involving inducing learned 142 
helplessness (personal communication Leif R. Lund, the Danish Animal Experiments 143 
Inspectorate). There do not seem to be many other examples. However, it is likely that in light of 144 
the legislation, many more possible applications have not been submitted or have been 145 
withdrawn or modified in the light of informal communication with the staff of the Animal 146 
Experiments Inspectorate. 147 
 148 
The idea was later taken up by the European Union and implemented in the most recent 149 
Directive 2010/63/EU,5 defining minimum requirements to be implemented in national 150 
legislation in all EU countries. In the Directive, Article 15(2) requires that “a procedure is not 151 
performed if it involves severe pain, suffering or distress that is likely to be long-lasting and 152 
cannot be ameliorated”.  153 
 154 
However, in the EU rules, unlike the Danish case, the ban on such procedures is not 155 
unconditional but linked to so-called “safeguard clauses”, to the effect that the requirement can 156 
be suspended “for exceptional and scientifically justifiable reasons” (Article 55(3)). If taking 157 
such a measure, an EU Member State is obliged to inform the European Commission within a 158 
month. By July 2019, no such notifications had been received by the Commission (Susanna 159 
8 
 
Louhimies, personal communication). Whereas this may be considered reason for cautious 160 
optimism that indeed, no experiments are done in which animals are made to suffer severely, it is 161 
also important to notice that whether a procedure is considered to involve severe pain, suffering, 162 
or distress and what is understood as long-lasting are the responsibilities of review committees to 163 
define in each individual case. As guidance is relatively general, without specific examples of 164 
what makes suffering count as severe and/or long-lasting, and there are several hundred review 165 
bodies in the EU,8 there is likely to be considerable variation in how these rules are applied.  166 
 167 
The idea of an upper ceiling for suffering of animals used in research also exists in regulatory 168 
documents outside the EU. The strongest position is found in Canada, where the guidance for 169 
protocol review states that "Procedures that involve sustained and/or inescapable severe pain or 170 
deprivation in conscious animals (…) are considered highly questionable or unacceptable, 171 
irrespective of the significance of anticipated results.”9; however, such experiments can still be 172 
approved and in 2017 involved 2% of all animals used in Canada.10  173 
 174 
There is also no upper limit on laboratory animal suffering allowed under US laws and 175 
regulations. However, when conducting experiments classified as Category E (unalleviated pain 176 
and/or distress, included in mandatory annual reports of animal use submitted to the federal 177 
government by registered research institutions11), researchers need to provide additional 178 
justification that there is no acceptable alternative to the protocol as proposed. In practice, there 179 
is considerable variation between how Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees in the US 180 
review outcomes in general12 general and specifically as to what is judged to be alleviated versus 181 
unalleviated pain or distress (Category D versus E), what constitutes temporary (Category C) 182 
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versus longer pain or distress (Categories D, E), and what is an acceptable alternative (see also13, 183 
pp173-183). It should also be noted that the definition of Category E is based on whether or not pain 184 
or distress is alleviated rather than on how severe the pain or distress is. 185 
 186 
Other nations and regions of the world appear similarly to avoid imposing limitations on 187 
experiments inducing severe and prolonged pain or distress.14 188 
 189 
So the idea of an upper limit to the suffering that an animal may endure during an experiment has 190 
already been implemented, at least partially, in some parts of the world. However, to make full 191 
sense of that, more needs to be said about what animal suffering is. To this we will now turn. 192 
 193 
What Is Suffering And Which Forms of Suffering Exist?  194 
 195 
In the animal welfare literature, the term suffering has been used both as a generic term for 196 
negative subjective experiences, and to identify negative experiences that are especially severe or 197 
prolonged15,16 .  On the latter view suffering is therefore viewed as more than an unpleasant but 198 
routine part of life. Having to give a talk to a large audience may induce anxiety, while strenuous 199 
exercise is likely to result in muscle pain. Yet some of us even volunteer to give a plenary lecture 200 
or run a marathon. And few would argue that transient, self-induced, and relatively mild 201 
unpleasantness equals suffering. These experiences are not intense or long-lasting enough to 202 
affect our mood or to interfere with our capacity to carry on our daily life. The situation is not 203 
very different from the more common ailments that affect modern humans. A head cold may 204 
interfere with our capacity to concentrate, to enjoy food and even to sleep well, but it lasts only a 205 
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few days. A stomach bug or the flu may indeed make one feel desperately ill but, again, the 206 
unpleasantness is usually short-lasting and we assume we can endure it without lasting trauma.  207 
 208 
So even though “suffering” as a technical term may sometimes be used to cover all forms of 209 
negative subjective experiences there is an everyday use of the term where such experiences 210 
counts as suffering only when they are intense or long lasting. Many humans consider they are 211 
“suffering” only when one intense or long lasting negative experience (e.g. pain or disease) is 212 
further accompanied by other situational factors (e.g. extreme fear, loss of control or lack of 213 
social support) to the point that their condition seems unbearable and their sense of self is 214 
threatened16 citing Cassel 1982. In light of this usage the phrase “mild suffering” which is found in EU 215 
regulation of animal experimentation5 may seem to be an oxymoron. Similarly, our use of the 216 
term “severe” might be considered unnecessary. However, precisely because phrases such as 217 
“mild” or “moderate suffering” are used in a diverse scientific and regulatory literature, we retain 218 
use of the term “severe suffering” whilst acknowledging that many of the examples we discuss 219 
will mirror states defined by some16 simply as “suffering”.  220 
 221 
Pain has traditionally been seen as the primary or the most likely contributory component of 222 
suffering. However, during the 20th century there was a growing awareness that other forms of 223 
subjective experience could also contribute to suffering. The following definition of suffering 224 
was provided by the 1965 British Report of the Departmental Committee on Experiments on 225 
Animals (The so-called Littlewood Report) and subsequently adopted by the Brambell 226 
Committee’s report17 (note that the adjectives negative and positive here are used to refer to 227 
whether the sign is absent (negative) or present (positive), not to whether or not it is desirable): 228 
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 229 
(a) discomfort (such as may be characterised by such negative signs as poor condition, torpor, 230 
diminished appetite); (b) stress (i.e. a condition of tension or anxiety predictable or readily 231 
explicable from environmental causes whether distinct from or including physical causes); 232 
(c) pain (recognisable by more positive signs such as struggling, screaming or squealing, 233 
convulsions, severe palpitation). 234 
 235 
These different kinds of states may be distinguished by their sensory origin. Thus pain originates 236 
in the detection of threat to bodily integrity or function. Many other threats are similarly detected 237 
by animals’ sensory systems, including thirst, hunger, cold, heat, nausea, dizziness, and 238 
breathlessness.18 In animals with a capacity for conscious experience, the detection of each of 239 
these threats may be accompanied by negative subjective experiences. However, there are also 240 
forms of suffering that reflect animals’ perceptions of their external situation without being 241 
linked to specific forms of sensation, e.g., fear and anxiety. Finally, there may be negative 242 
mental conditions which are not tied to the perception of external events, such as depression.  243 
 244 
The study of animal emotion focuses on understanding the multi-component (behavioural, 245 
cognitive, and subjective) responses of animals to these situations. Russell19 developed an 246 
influential and useful framework to consider emotion. His core affect model characterizes 247 
emotions on two dimensions: valence (positive/negative) and arousal (energy/lethargy). Human 248 
emotions situated within this dimensional space include anxiety, fear, panic, frustration, anger, 249 
helplessness, loneliness, and boredom.  250 
 251 
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Whereas there is some debate about whether using such names or labels to describe emotions in 252 
animals is valid, the core affect model can be applied to animals without naming specific 253 
emotions,20 and indeed core affects exist in humans without being labeled, interpreted, or 254 
attributed to any cause.19 Humans share basic emotional brain-behaviour circuits with other 255 
vertebrate species21-23 and it is quite valid to consider, for example, fear and anxiety as emotions 256 
generated within the amygdala, which lead to freezing or fleeing responses in most vertebrate 257 
species. But many of the other emotional systems identified by Panksepp and others, particularly 258 
those associated with the evolution of social attachment (lust, care, nurturance), may be restricted 259 
to mammals and some birds. 260 
 261 
From an evolutionary perspective, negative emotions are useful for animals in shaping behavior 262 
both in the short (act immediately to get away from a negative experience) and the longer term 263 
(learn to avoid something which in the past has resulted in negative experiences). The ability to 264 
act on negative experiences is equally important as regards a negative emotional experience such 265 
as fear. If the animal responds appropriately, then fear (however intense) may be fleeting and 266 
transitory. 267 
 268 
But for laboratory animals, sometimes suffering can become severe because the experimental 269 
protocol or in vivo assay prevents the animal from taking any effective steps to remove the 270 
threat. So lack of control compounds the threat itself – animals in confinement cannot avoid 271 
imposed heat or go elsewhere to find food – and eventually if nothing is done to mitigate impact, 272 
animals may die in studies of extreme environmental challenges.24,25  273 
 274 
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Indeed, there is a body of work that demonstrates that animals that are able to control or 275 
terminate their exposure to negative events have significantly improved welfare relative to 276 
animals that experience exactly the same events (including duration and intensity) but for which 277 
the events are uncontrollable.26,27 This may explain why an inability to control exposure to 278 
aversive events is strongly associated with the development of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 279 
(PTSD), a debilitating psychological condition in humans. In PTSD, fear is experienced 280 
frequently and repeatedly, outside of the initial fear-inducing event. A “typical” procedure to 281 
induce PTSD in an animal model is to immobilize rats in cones and place them in a cage next to 282 
a cat in a situation that they cannot escape.28   283 
 284 
We can see that suffering can arise from exposure to a wide range of different external and 285 
internal events that threaten biological or social functions. The severity of suffering generated 286 
may be mediated by the animals’ perceptions of their own situation and the degree of control 287 
they are able to exert.   288 
 289 
What Makes Severe Suffering Qualitatively Different from Other Unpleasant Experiences?  290 
 291 
The moral view that there should be an upper limit to how much animals should have to endure 292 
in research and testing may appear to involve simple quantitative reasoning: the more (in terms 293 
of duration and intensity) there is of this bad thing the worse it becomes and one has to draw the 294 
line somewhere. But it is also possible to argue that severe suffering is qualitatively different 295 
from other levels of suffering in a way that is morally relevant and which justifies an absolute 296 
limit.  297 
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 298 
To make our case we will turn to the study of the human psychology of suffering and the 299 
interaction between distressing experiences and wider aspects of human functioning. Thus, based 300 
on an analogy with human suffering, we hope to make vivid a qualitative difference between 301 
negative subjective states that fall within the adaptive coping capacity of the individual and 302 
where recovery is possible, versus severe suffering where intense or long-lasting negative 303 
experiences are accompanied by other situational factors, to an extent that profound and long-304 
lasting damage is caused, and a full recovery may not be possible.  305 
 306 
One way that a human copes with negative subjective experiences that are not too severe and not 307 
too long lasting is keeping them at arm’s length by focusing on the more exciting or positive 308 
aspects of one’s life. In the short-term someone with flu may still listen to the radio or get 309 
pleasure from hearing they have obtained a reward of some sort, while in the longer-term 310 
someone who has lost a leg may focus on a new hobby such as painting. However, under some 311 
circumstances there may simply be so much pain or other negative experience that there is little 312 
room for anything else in one’s attention and little possibility of distraction. If pain or other form 313 
of suffering is long-lasting, it may become part of one’s perception of who one is and what one’s 314 
life is. The Schema Enmeshment Model of Pain in human psychology describes a situation 315 
where an individual in chronic pain is unable to separate their self from their pain.29  316 
 317 
In psychology, schemas refer to cognitive frameworks which seem inherently difficult to apply 318 
to non-verbal animals. Testing this in humans relies on verbal associations which are difficult to 319 
transfer to animals. Taking a wider view, associations between cognitive ability and capacity to 320 
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suffer must be carefully evaluated and differing cognitive capacities of species should be 321 
distinguished. Some animals (e.g., corvids, some primates) use episodic memories, the capacity 322 
to remember where, when, and what happened in the past, as a template that allows them 323 
perform a degree of “future” thinking and planning.28 In terms of suffering, however, such 324 
cognitive capacity may be a double-edged sword. A future-thinking animal may be able to 325 
anticipate both the termination of a short-term painful event and the onset of further pain. On the 326 
other hand, as has been argued by Rollin,31 the lack of ability of most animals to anticipate the 327 
end of suffering may add panic or despair to an already unpleasant experience. 328 
 329 
An important feature of severe suffering is that it dominates attention in a manner that is 330 
qualitatively different from other forms of negative experience.The dominance of suffering will 331 
prevent one from carrying out everyday behaviours. Asking persons to identify how much their 332 
pain interferes with normal life is in fact one of the approaches used in research into and clinical 333 
management of chronic pain.32 334 
 335 
Situations of severe pain, stress or social loss are important risk factors for depression in humans 336 
but many of the features characteristic of depression in humans (anhedonia, reduced activity, 337 
negative cognitive bias) are also present in animals that have been exposed to analogous 338 
situations. Whereas depression can be described as losing the capacity to enjoy life, in the most 339 
extreme situation, a huge emotional trauma may lead to the loss of will to live and in fact even be 340 
deadly, a situation sometimes referred to in clinical psychology as “give-up-itis”. This is a 341 
“quantitative regression from normal, adaptive, goal-directed behaviour that passes through a 342 
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clinical spectrum from withdrawal, apathy, aboulia and psychic akinesia to psychogenic 343 
death.”.33  344 
 345 
The concept of adaptive behavior is critical to our understanding of a qualitative difference 346 
between severe suffering and other forms of negative experience. In response to a wide range of 347 
challenges, a human or animal shows allostasis,34 an adaptive response is mounted, and stability 348 
can be regained after physiological or psychologically stressful events have ended. Some degree 349 
of suffering may occur during an allostaic response but this will not have a long-lasting or 350 
dominating effect on the animal’s life. Events that result in severe suffering, on the other hand 351 
are destabilising and physiological or psychological stability cannot be regained even if the 352 
external situation improves. Severe suffering is thus associated with a failure to cope (such that a 353 
current trajectory will lead to premature death) or with a long-term struggle to cope whereby all 354 
resources have to be devoted to counter the situation. In such cases the individual is 355 
fundamentally changed for the worse.  356 
 357 
In humans, extreme anxiety and depression can result in life-threatening sequelae such as 358 
ischemic heart disease or catatonia35. Animals too can clearly die from depression and other 359 
forms of severe suffering if they fail to cope.  Harlow36 reported an experiment where four infant 360 
monkeys were raised with warm cloth-covered surrogate “mothers”. Repeated or prolonged 361 
chilling of the surrogates produced increasing frequencies of severely disturbed  behavior and by 362 
the end of two weeks, Harlow concluded that the procedure had precipitated the death of one of 363 
the infants.  364 
 365 
17 
 
Affected animals may give up eating or maintaining other vital tasks, but it is impossible to 366 
assess directly whether or not they would judge their own lives to be no longer worth living. 367 
Whether life is worth living is not something that can be objectiely measured and deciding this 368 
is, in humans, perhaps the ultimate subjective calculation. Tragically, some humans do judge that 369 
their lives are not worth living and take steps to end them. Whatever the specific circumstances, 370 
such people have found their situation unbearable, and understanding their perceived reasons 371 
(whether right or wrong) is an important goal in understanding how to prevent others reaching 372 
the same point.  373 
 374 
Systematic analysis of notes left behind by people who have died by suicide37 reveals the 375 
startling influence of social factors. People who feel they are a burden to others, or that they do 376 
not belong to a group, are at particular risk of judging life to be not worth living. Loneliness in 377 
humans is also associated with other serious declines in physical and mental health.38,39 The 378 
importance of social factors shows that we should be aware of the impact of social loss, social 379 
defeat, and social isolation as potential sources of severe suffering in those species capable of 380 
forming close social attachments. The total social isolation of young monkeys, for example, with 381 
the devastating long-term behavioural consequences that result,40 can indeed be expected to have 382 
produced animals whose lives were filled with severe suffering.  383 
 384 
The examples presented here from the human clinical literature and the corollaries drawn to the 385 
animal scientific literature make vivid the conclusion that severe suffering is more than merely a 386 
quantitative increase in negative state. Weary16 has argued that whilst there may be quantitatively 387 
different levels of pain or disease, this only becomes “suffering” (or in our terminology “severe 388 
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suffering”) when when the original negative experience becomes overwhelming, threatening an 389 
individual’s very sense of self. The shift to unbearable may be precipitated when intense pain is 390 
accompanied by negative situational factors such as loss of control, fear or anxiety or lack of 391 
social support.  We encourage others to consider how this shift might best be recognized in 392 
animals.  393 
 394 
Our starting proposal (not necessarily exclusive or complete) is that severe suffering occurs 395 
when  negative experiences dominate attention; there is limited capacity for distraction or 396 
compensation; normal life cannot be pursued; full recovery cannot occur even if the external 397 
situation improves; or  (in humans) one’s own life is judged not to be worth living.  We develop 398 
this theme with some practical examples in the  section How to Measure Severe Suffering.  399 
 400 
How Should the Idea of an Absolute Cap on Animal Suffering Be Underpinned in Terms of 401 
Moral Theory?  402 
 403 
The idea of putting an absolute cap on the level of suffering to which animals may be exposed 404 
seems to add an element into the moral framework underpinning the use of animals for 405 
experimentation that goes against the overall consequentialist idea of weighing harms of the 406 
animals used against the potential benefits of the research. According to this consequentialist 407 
idea there should be no limit to how severe suffering animals should be allowed to experience in 408 
research, provided that the potential and likely benefit of the research or testing is high enough 409 
and provided it is not possible to achieve the same benefit through an experiment or a test where 410 
the animals experience a lower level of suffering. 411 
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 412 
One way to understand the idea of an absolute cap is by saying that the ethical theory 413 
underpinning animal research should indeed include a deontological constraint not to expose 414 
animal in our care to severe suffering. This seems to be the position of Beauchamp and Morton.41 415 
They frame the position within their version of pluralist principlism, where the cap follows from 416 
the application of the principle of non-maleficience: “For research animals, as for humans, pain 417 
is pain, suffering is suffering, and distress is distress, wherever they occur—in animal 418 
laboratories no less than human healthcare centers. As levels of these harms increase, they could 419 
reach the level of brutal, inhumane, and merciless actions. The more investigations approach 420 
these levels, the more a policy of firm upper limits is needed.”41(p443) 421 
 422 
The view expressed by Beauchamp and Morton does seem to contain a element often associated 423 
with deontology, the idea that motives and not just consequences matter for the moral 424 
assessement of  actions – what is problematic about conducting experiments where animals can 425 
be foreseen to endure severe suffering seems, according to the quoted view, not just to be what 426 
happens to the animals but that the animals are deliberately subjected to “brutal, inhumane, and 427 
merciless actions” perpetrated by humans.  428 
 429 
It is also possible to envision a version of this view in line with a classical animal rights position 430 
where focus is solely on the rights of the recipient not to be exposed to non-trivial harms, 431 
including severe suffering, rather than on the motives of the agent.  432 
 433 
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However, even on utilitarian and other consequentialist views, focusing on achieving the best 434 
possible balance of welfare across animals and humans, it may be possible to justify an absolute 435 
cap on research involving severe suffering – not based on an argument to the effect that that 436 
imposing severe suffering is in principle wrong (be it grounded on requirements for certan 437 
motives or on appeal to absolute rights) but on more pragmatic considerations: if scientists are 438 
allowed to do experiments with severe suffering, many of them will find a justification for why 439 
their experiment qualifies; if scientists are not allowed to do experiments with severe suffering, 440 
they are likely to find an alternative way of achieving the same aim without imposing severe 441 
suffering on the animals. In addition, an experiment that intentionally results in severe suffering 442 
may be poor science because data obtained from such an animal may have little relevance to the 443 
purpose of the experiment. Given the high moral weight that a consequentialist should give to 444 
preventing severe suffering (cf previous section) these considerations certainly make sense.  445 
 446 
So-called two-level consequentialism, originally developed by R.M. Hare42 and later applied to 447 
animals by Gary Varner43, may be evoked to underpin the just presented line of thinking: the 448 
idea here is that most people are bad at making consequentialist calculations. They will tend to 449 
underestimate the harms to animals when they are believed to be necessary to achieve human 450 
benefits or to acquire scientific scientific knowledge. Therefore in most cases it will, from a 451 
consequentialist view, be better to abide by simpler principles. One such simpler principle could 452 
be not to allow animal experiments where the animals are likely to endure severe suffering. Of 453 
course, an even more simple principle would be to ban all experiments involving any form of 454 
suffering. However, this principle may have too large negative effects on research to be 455 
acceptable from a consequentialist point of view. 456 
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 457 
Even on anthropocentric terms, according to which animal welfare does not matter in its own 458 
right, there may be reasons to try to put at cap on the suffering that animals are allowed to 459 
endure, based on the reality44 that severe suffering will be unacceptable for many people in 460 
society that, in turn, can erode public support for animal research. 461 
 462 
The conclusion here is that the idea of putting a cap on severe suffering may be justified from 463 
multiple ethical perspectives. Much will hinge on the extent to which there will be a real 464 
dilemma between the concern for avoiding severe suffering in animals and ensuring that research 465 
of importance to human and animal health is undertaken. In what follows we will explore to 466 
what extent it is possible to avoid imposing severe suffering on animals during experiments 467 
without giving up the potential benefits of new ways to cure, prevent or alleviate serious human 468 
diseases. Before we get to that we will say a bit about how to measure the level of suffering in 469 
animals and specifically how to draw the line between severe and less than severe suffering. 470 
 471 
How to Measure Severe Suffering  472 
 473 
Existing guidelines and assessment frameworks45 typically refer to aspects such as frequency, 474 
intensity, and duration of aversive events as a way to determine severity of suffering. However, 475 
to apply this in a qualified manner also requires insight into how animals are affected by the total 476 
load of aversive experiences (including a consideration of additive, multiplicative, and 477 
cumulative effects46-48) to which they may or may not habituate.  478 
 479 
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Many techniques have been developed to measure the degree of animal suffering arising from 480 
mildly unpleasant experiences or from more severe events. For example, the suffering evoked by 481 
rough handling, electric shock, or a noxious chemical could be assessed by measuring an 482 
animal’s active avoidance responses (e.g., the effort expended by fish to avoid chemicals in the 483 
water49).  However, for many species, exposure to such events can provoke innate responses 484 
such as “freezing” in place or withdrawal that can interfere with appropriate active test 485 
responses.50 In these situations, passive tests provide an alternative approach. These measure the 486 
extent to which an animal will either refrain from moving towards a particular stimulus51,52 or 487 
forgo desired resources such as food or social contact53 to avoid an aversive event. In yet other 488 
contexts where there is no clear external focus, conditioned place preference tests (CPP) can be 489 
used to assess the degree of suffering arising from states such as chronic pain or anxiety.  490 
 491 
CPP tests are based on the observation that animals can develop associations between distinctive 492 
locations and their own internal state. For example, hens with keel fractures54 and mice with 493 
bladder cancer55 prefer locations where they were previously given analgesic drugs over control 494 
locations where no pain relief was available. Animals that are free from injury or disease exhibit 495 
lesser or no such preferences, showing that the CPP test does give us insight into suffering that 496 
would otherwise remain invisible.  497 
 498 
However, all of the above methods are problematic when it comes to measuring severe suffering. 499 
Very high levels of pain or stress will interfere with an animal’s ability to store and recall 500 
information.56 At such a point, the ability of animal to take control and  “tell” us anything about 501 
its own state becomes limited. In addition, none of the standard methods of assessing animal 502 
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welfare focus on the qualitatively distinct features of severe suffering outlined previously. The 503 
importance of careful analogy with humans therefore becomes even more critical. We can 504 
consider those situations that result in severe suffering in humans and explore whether (and 505 
which) animals may share similar experiences. Some forms of human suffering (dread of a 506 
meaningless future, or despair about the state of the planet) may require cognitive processing that 507 
is beyond the capacity of any other animal species. But severe human suffering due to other 508 
causes, such as chronic pain or loss of a close social companion, can produce analogous 509 
responses in animals, even if these cannot be formally measured using the usual methods.  510 
 511 
Instead, rather than focusing on simple welfare indicators (cortisol levels, bruises, etc.) or 512 
measures of preference or aversion, the identification of severe suffering in animals may require 513 
us to measure depression-like states of withdrawal and apathy,57 hyperactivity, or other changes 514 
which reflect profound changes in general (non-system-specific) arousal, activity, and brain 515 
function.51 In addition, we should consider those permanent and fundamental changes that occur 516 
when allostasis can not longer be maintained. Korte and collaborators34 mention changes such as 517 
violence, chronic fatigue, or atrophy of brain regions as signs that an animal is no longer able to 518 
mount an adaptive response. Such asssesments of severe suffering should also measure the extent 519 
to which damage or injury in one functional system affects other functional systems, like the 520 
extent to which severe pain may greatly reduce appetite, mobility, sleep, or disrupt social 521 
behavior. As a specific example, researchers attempting to induce PTSD in animals deliberately 522 
measure a range of outcomes to ensure their protocols have produced not only a specific negative 523 
experience such as extreme fear (in response to repeated exposure to predatory stimuli) and/or 524 
pain (in response to respeated electric shock) but a wider range of life-changing impacts that 525 
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might model human traumatic experience. Thus, researchers will ensure that their protocols also 526 
evoke other responses such as extremely reduced exploratory behavior, persistent 527 
hypervigilance, memory of fearful events and changes in blood pressure28, 59. 528 
 529 
Whereas it is of course important to be able to measure suffering, it also seems reasonable to 530 
assume – until proven otherwise – severe suffering in higher vertebrates and other similarly 531 
complex animals in situations that are known to cause severe suffering in humans, and where the 532 
suffering in humans does not depend on cognitive capacities that are beyond the capacity of the 533 
animal in question. 534 
 535 
So to conclude, just as for humans, suffering in animals will be influenced by intensity, duration, 536 
and loss of control. The qualitative tipping point may be signified when suffering dominates their 537 
attention, compensation cannot occur, normal life cannot be experienced, and) the animal cannot 538 
fully recover and will be fundamentally changed even if the external situation improves.  539 
 540 
Are There Ways to Avoid Imposing Severe Suffering Without Forgoing Animal Research 541 
of Importance to Finding New Ways to Cure, Prevent, or Alleviate Serious Human 542 
Disease?  543 
 544 
To attain consensus on limiting the severity of endpoints in animal research protocols, it may 545 
help to ask why severe endpoints for animal models of disease and injury are employed in the 546 
first place? The historical answer involves using animals to model not only the pathogenesis of a 547 
human illness or injury, but its severity as well. Extensive suffering and eventual lethality in 548 
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animal models have been considered de rigueur if those outcomes occurred in the corresponding 549 
human patient. This linkage remains entrenched in the biomedical research establishment even 550 
though our understanding of disease advanced from organismic to microscopic and molecular 551 
scales long ago for many severe medical conditions.  552 
 553 
Reluctance to adopt less severe endpoints can be due to peer pressure to have one’s research, 554 
grant proposal, institutional animal protocol, submitted manuscript, or regulatory acceptability 555 
comply with established norms, as heard over many years by two of us (IASO and SMN). 556 
Arguments have been published to the contrary, that less severe endpoints for severe diseases are 557 
not only more humane but may also offer better scientific precision than allowing an afflicted 558 
animal to continue to deteriorate and ultimately become moribund or succumb.13,60 But progress 559 
in implementation of such endpoints has been glacially slow for animal models of many severe 560 
diseases, such as sepsis,61 cancer,62 and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis,63 to name a few. 561 
 562 
From the above conflicting viewpoints, one realizes that a fundamental intellectual, and some 563 
argue morally justified, basis for retaining severe endpoints in animals that model severe human 564 
illness or injury comes from government agencies responsible for reviewing, approving, and 565 
regulating new medical products for those indications. Regulators have usually insisted that, for 566 
diseases and injuries that can be fatal, clinical trials of a new product must demonstrate a 567 
statistically sound improvement in patient longevity before market approval can be given; in the 568 
oncology field, this has evolved from “overall survival” to “progression-free survival”.64 Since 569 
improving patients’ lives via better drugs and medical devices is the goal of biomedical research, 570 
it follows that getting those products to market is a major criterion for achieving that goal. 571 
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Regulators’ requirement for extended patient longevity implies and even mandates to many 572 
scientists that animal subjects administered a trial drug, etc. likewise must live (longer) while 573 
untreated animals must die (sooner), thereby making severe animal suffering and eventual death 574 
unavoidable. 575 
 576 
However, if established clinical regulatory convictions are deemed a valid rationale for 577 
reluctance to consider less severe animal model endpoints, then more recent clinical regulatory 578 
perspectives offer hope. Most prominently starting with the AIDS crisis almost 40 years ago, 579 
when patients with AIDS were dying by the thousands and hundreds of thousands of persons 580 
infected with HIV were likely to die given the absence of effective treatments, the US FDA 581 
replaced AIDS patient longevity with an alternative endpoint to accelerate approval of new anti-582 
retroviral drugs. It had been established that the number of CD4+ leucocytes circulating in the 583 
blood in HIV+ persons was highly correlated with and inversely proportional to an individual’s 584 
likelihood to develop AIDS and die. A stronger and direct correlation quickly followed, between 585 
the amount of HIV-RNA in the blood and AIDS progression to death. With those relationships 586 
confirmed, FDA began approving drugs with no or tolerable side effects that slowed the decline 587 
of one’s CD4+ blood cell count and prevented HIV-RNA blood levels from rising, even before 588 
patient survival data were collected and analyzed. This radical change in approval criteria 589 
allowed many drugs to become available sooner and saved countless lives.65  590 
 591 
The use of CD4+ cell counts and HIV-RNA blood levels are merely early examples of so-called 592 
“surrogate endpoints” as alternatives to survival that have been adopted as approval criteria for 593 
many human clinical trials.66 Also known as biomarkers, such measurable changes in body 594 
27 
 
weight, a blood constituent, tissue biopsy, or radiological image can provide literally vital insight 595 
into the efficacy and safety of new drugs in clinical trials well before death. Because surrogate 596 
endpoints can be scientifically validated and get new drugs to market faster and at less cost, drug 597 
approval agencies in developed countries are promoting these endpoints in a coordinated 598 
fashion.67  599 
 600 
The question then arises: if regulatory review of new medical products for a given severe or fatal 601 
disease does not require worsening illness or death of patients as the ultimate benchmark of 602 
scientific progress before approval can be granted, then why must animals modeling those same 603 
diseases experience severe suffering or death? This question revolves around severe illness or 604 
injury for which much of the physical or chemical elements of disease progression are well 605 
known and, therefore, relatively easy to identify as potentially informative surrogate endpoints.  606 
 607 
But what about severe mental illnesses that can be just as debilitating and create just as much 608 
suffering, even in the absence of equivalent cognition, in the corresponding animal subject? No 609 
comparable surrogate endpoints like those mentioned above have been adopted yet for conditions 610 
such as severe depression and anxiety. That is probably because the underlying causes for these 611 
and other diseases of the mind have not yet been elucidated to the same degree. Considering the 612 
societal gains offered by clinical surrogate endpoints in general, there is an ethical as well as a 613 
scientific imperative to investigate and validate changes in empirical markers of severe mental 614 
illness prior to the patient or research animal reaching a dismal state. For example, loss of smell 615 
is a common early feature of Alzheimer’s Disease in both humans68 and rodent models69, and 616 
behavioural changes can predict severe outcomes in mice modeling Huntington’s Disease.70  617 
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 618 
Regardless of the existence or not of candidate or regulatory surrogate endpoints or clinical 619 
biomarkers, the severity of suffering in many animal models also can be mitigated by providing 620 
supportive care to those animals without jeopardizing the scientific aims of the protocol. In 621 
modeling illness and injury in animals, we too often omit non-specific components of medical 622 
care provided to patients, such as warmth, quiet, hydration, nutrition, and companionship that 623 
may have no bearing on a given drug’s activity but would be unconscionable as well as illegal to 624 
withhold at bedside. Animal models can be similarly enhanced to reduce the severity of pain or 625 
distress with no or acceptable adjustments necessary to one’s experimental objectives.71  626 
 627 
To wit, if one is developing new treatments to restore cardiac muscle contractility for congestive 628 
heart failure (CHF), why not administer diuretics to the animal model to avoid or delay eventual 629 
hypoxia or drowning from fluid buildup in the animal’s lungs (especially if one is not studying 630 
pulmonary congestion that accompanies a progressively weakening heart)? Provision of diuretics 631 
is standard supportive care in human and veterinary patients with CHF, and would similarly 632 
prolong the life of the laboratory animal subject to enable a longer period of observation and data 633 
generation. Not only is the animal more comfortable but the “model” would now encompass a 634 
more representative clincal scenario to judge those experimental treatments better. 635 
 636 
It is encouraging to see that medical regulators have started to acknowledge the scientific as well 637 
as ethical merit in providing supportive care to animals modeled to severe and fatal illness. For 638 
example, the FDA’s Guidance to Industry for product development under the so-called Animal 639 
Rule states for animal models, “Investigational drugs should be evaluated within the context that 640 
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reflects anticipated clinical use” and “When included in an animal efficacy study, supportive care 641 
ideally should reflect the intended conditions of use of the investigational drug. It also should 642 
reflect the intended types of medical intervention and the timing of the availability of medical 643 
intervention expected in the human clinical or incident setting.”.72 Even more heartening, the 644 
Implementation Working Group for ICH Guideline S9: Nonclinical Evaluation for Anticancer 645 
Pharmaceuticals is allowing supportive care such as antibiotics for animals on toxicology studies 646 
that have secondary infections from test article-induced immunosuppression because “Patients 647 
with cancer are often given supportive care (e.g., antibiotics)”.73  648 
 649 
What to Do in Cases Where It Is Not Possible to Avoid Imposing Severe Suffering Without 650 
Prohibiting Vital Research? 651 
 652 
We have been arguing that there is a strong ethical case to ban animal experiments involving 653 
severe suffering. An easy way for us to avoid having to face difficult dilemmas would have been 654 
to claim that it is always possible to avoid imposing severe suffering on research animals without 655 
having to face any loss in terms of scientific and medical outcomes. However, this would have 656 
been an inappropriate avoidance of reality. 657 
 658 
In fact. many will, argue that there are quite a few actual cases where there would be a real 659 
dilemma between preventionpreventing severe animal suffering and enabling research of 660 
potential vital human importance. Take a lethal, painful and highly contagious human disease 661 
such as that caused by the Ebola virus (EBV). This was firmly established as a lethal pathogen in 662 
humans for many years, with a case fatality rate upwards of 80% in actual outbreaks. To mirror 663 
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that outcome, macaque monkeys used in EBV research were given lethal doses of virus to see if 664 
a candidate vaccine or anti-viral drug of interest would prevent death74, with no winners 665 
emerging from decades of trying.  666 
 667 
But during the 2014-2016 outbreak in West Africa, the case fatality rate averaged 40%, often 668 
correlating extensive and prolonged supportive care with a better prognosis75. This, in turn, 669 
required researchers to modify their previous assumptions and revise (refine) their animal models 670 
to encompass a wider range of possible clinical outcomes. One hopes that that such refinements 671 
will identify candidate vaccines and anti-viral drugs of sufficient promise for clinical trials 672 
without relying solely on animal survival (following severe pain and distress) as the primary 673 
endpoint. In the context of the discussion above, there may be reason to believe that surrogate 674 
endpoints or biomarkers may be reliably informative of protection or efficacy in earlier or milder 675 
stages of infection before the inoculated animal subject becomes sick to a point where it must 676 
endure severe suffering. 677 
 678 
What if one is studying severe pain or distress itself? Our contention remains that with new 679 
scientific discoveries amid an acceleration of understanding how molecules, cells, tissues, and 680 
organs behave and can be studied in health and disease, the study of severe pain or distress does 681 
not, de facto, require equivalent states in animal subjects.  Instead, and like other areas of 682 
research on severe diseases and injuries, new combinations of experimental approaches are 683 
possible that are just as informative without involving severe animal pain or distress.  684 
 685 
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We invite others with a different opinion to offer specific examples of exceptions to a ban on 686 
severe pain in animal research where there will be a real dilemma between the concern to protect 687 
animals against severe suffering and the concern to find new ways to cure, prevent, or 688 
alleviateserious diseases in humans and animals. In the meantime, it would be dogmatic of us to 689 
deny that such examples could be forthcoming. Therefore, the question arises whether such 690 
experiments should be allowed and undertaken. In the rest of the section we will aim to address 691 
this, possibly hypothetical, question as well as  a raft of other ethical questions: 1) Do the means 692 
always justify the end? If we accept that torture should not be allowed, even in situations where 693 
it could serve to save many lives, should we not take a similar stand here? 2) Do animals 694 
ultimately matter less than humans when it comes to vital human issues? 3) Does it matter what 695 
species the animal is, whether it is a chimpanzee, a mouse, or a fish? 4) Should the experiments 696 
still be allowed, even if you personally find o them unacceptable? 697 
 698 
The answers to these questions will clearly depend on one’s ethical outlook. To simplify, we will 699 
elaborate on responses from three kinds of outlooks presented above: an animal rights view, a 700 
deontological view giving room for some animal experimentation, and a consequentialist view. 701 
 702 
On an animal rights view the answer is simple. Since on this view the means never justify the 703 
ends when it comes to imposing harm on an innocent third party, since sentient animals in 704 
principle matter equally to humans, since species is in principle morally irrelevant, and since the 705 
law should protect rights, such experiments should not be allowed and undertaken. 706 
 707 
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According to the kind of deontological view defended by Beauchamp and Morton and referred to 708 
above, the answers will be much less clear. Here the means can justify the end only if the end is 709 
important enough (not all deontologists are pacifists). Humans will ultimately matter more than 710 
animals (that is why animal experimentation is accepted in the first place). Species may matter 711 
since some animals are more human-like than others. There may be a distinction between what 712 
one will not accept personally and what should be banned by law. So this kind of view could end 713 
up accepting a very stringent safeguard clause that would allow for certain exceptions to a 714 
general ban on animal experiments involving severe suffering. 715 
 716 
According to a consequentialist view the answer is clear in principle: the end always justifies the 717 
means if there is the right balance of harms and benefits. Animals and humans matter equally 718 
when interests are of the same sort. Species does not matter in its own right. And laws should be 719 
put to use to achieve the best possible outcomes. So, in principle an experiment that could save 720 
many human lives should be allowed and undertaken no matter whether it would also cause 721 
severe animal suffering. However, given the kind of two-level consequentialism described above 722 
things may be less clear in practice. This is so because allowing experiments under special 723 
circumstances that give rise to severe suffering may lead to a slippery slope where, as today, far 724 
too much suffering is imposed on animals compared to the expected human benefits.  725 
 726 
An illuminating analogy may be made to the case of using torture on humans. A consequentialist 727 
should, in principle, be in favour of allowing torture in extreme cases where it may help to save 728 
the life of a large number of innocent people. However, an adherent of two-level 729 
consequentialism may have good reasons to support a total and fully enforced legal ban on 730 
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torture. This may be based on evidence that torture does not normally serve its purpose of 731 
making people reveal critical information and, secondly, the reasonable expectation that without 732 
such a ban a lot of unnecessary torture would happen. Thus in consequentialist terms a ban on 733 
torture may bring about better net consequences than allowing exceptions for the rare cases. 734 
However, the question remains to what extent the animal experimentation case is analogous to 735 
the human torture case. Would it in the animal experimentation case be possible to enforce a 736 
reasonable safeguard clause? 737 
 738 
Unless one adheres to a consistent animal rights view, there is no simple black or white answer 739 
to the ethical question of whether or not to allow severe animal experiments in exceptional 740 
circumstances regulated by safeguard clauses. There will be room for differences in opinion, and 741 
the authors of this paper may have slightly different views on this issue. However, we fully agree 742 
that much more needs to be done than is currently done, to limit experiments where animals have 743 
to endure severe suffering. 744 
 745 
Conclusion 746 
 747 
We have argued that severe suffering is qualitatively different from less severe suffering. Severe 748 
suffering may be recognized by more than one sign, but we highlight certain tipping points 749 
where suffering dominates all aspects of an animal’s life, where it cannot find any compensatory 750 
pleasure, where it struggles to maintain normal function and is fundamentally changed, where its 751 
fear turns into PTSD, its sadness to depression, and its recovery is unlikely. These criteria should 752 
be implemented in documents giving guidance on how to classify levels of animal suffering. 753 
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Crucially, we also argue that severe endpoints are typically no longer necessary in animal models 754 
of severe disease, injury, and in vivo assays due to an enlightened clinical regulatory framework 755 
that continues to evolve in a positive (i.e., more humane) direction and should influence future 756 
preclinical study design. So the old notion that only severe endpoints are acceptable to peer 757 
review for funding, publication, protocol approval, and eventual regulatory acceptability is no 758 
longer defensible. Second, even if animals are “required” to decline in health (e.g., one is 759 
studying the actual physiology of extreme endpoints or dying), those animals will not have to 760 
suffer as badly if they are provided simple and common supportive care, which, of course, needs 761 
to be applied in a thoughtful manner to minimize any resultant data “noise”. In most cases, such 762 
measures will be able to prevent suffering from becoming severe. 763 
  764 
So, if we are right, severe endpoints no longer need be tolerated in the vast majority of 765 
experiments or tests involving laboratory animals, and medical progress will not be impeded by 766 
embracing those Refinements needed to avoid severe suffering. From this it follows that not only 767 
from ethical positions whose aim is immediate abolition but also from more anthropocentric 768 
ethical stances will it make sense to favour a regulatory ban on animal experiments involving 769 
severe suffering. 770 
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